基于利益相关者理论的水电工程保险研究

以收集的水利水电工程保险服务项目106项招投标数据为研究对象,基于利益相关者理论,从各主要利益相关者视角阐释了保险人、被保险人、保险经纪人的行为特点,特别对水利水电工程保险费率的测算方法和中标费率的特征进行分析,以为水利水电工程保险行业的持续健康发展提出相关政策建议。     

Welfare costs of reclassification risk in the health insurance market

We assess the quantitative importance of reclassification risk in the US health insurance market. Reclassification risk arises because the health conditions of individuals evolve over time, while a typical health insurance contract only lasts for one year. Thus, a change in the health status can lead to a significant change in the health insurance premium. We measure welfare gains from introducing explicit insurance against this risk in the form of guaranteed renewable health insurance contracts. We find that in the current institutional environment individuals are well-sheltered against reclassification risk and they only moderately gain from having access to these contracts. More specifically, we show that employer-sponsored health insurance and public means-tested transfers play an important role in providing implicit insurance against reclassification risk. If these institutions are removed, the average welfare gains from having access to guaranteed renewable contracts exceed 4% of the annual consumption.     

Private Information in Life Insurance,Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets

Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.     

保险业新主体公司的经济绩效与组织管理及人力资本利用

近年来保险业许多成立的新主体公司,为了抢占市场份额,在所采取的各种组织措施和组织手段中,其最重要的组织管理与人力资源利用的制度却出现了矛盾和悖论,进而又出现了人力资源利用与经济绩效的悖论,并造成人力资本的原子状态,使公司成员缺乏团队精神,不能形成整体的合力,并带来公司内人际关系紧张等一系列严重问题。究其问题的核心,发现其组织管理制度和人才激励机制是对人的扭曲,把人降低为物当成了工具。这样的问题如果不能得到及早、尽快地解决,不仅会影响新主体公司的生存和发展,甚至会危及整个保险业的健康发展。     

论我国实行强制性环境责任保险制度的可行性——以环境责任保险制度的发展演进为视角

近年来,我国经济的高速发展带来了大量的社会问题,日益严重的环境污染问题就是其中之一。为了治理环境污染,提高污染企业的环境保护意识,我国于20世纪90年代初开始试行环境责任保险,经历了从任意性责任保险到强制性责任保险的发展历程,发展思路和模式也逐渐清晰,当前已经具备构建强制性环境责任保险制度的基本条件。实行强制性环境责任保险与企业社会责任理念相契合,投保环境责任保险是企业承担社会责任的方式之一。近年来我国政府相继出台了一系列推进强制性环境责任保险制度发展的规定,为制度构建奠定了政策基础。2014年4月24日新修订的《环境保护法》第52条明确规定国家鼓励投保环境强制责任保险,为制度构建提供了法律依据。我国在船舶油污损害强制责任保险和交强险方面的立法和实践可以为制度构建提供参考,同时在保险模式选择上可以借鉴西方国家成熟的环境责任保险制度。     

人口老龄化背景下的中国养老保险风险分析

伴随着我国人口老龄化的不断加速,社会保障尤其是养老保险领域的压力也随之加大,我国当前的养老保险体系也存在着一些现实问题与不足之处。而这都将导致在养老保险体系中固有的筹资、基金投资运营风险上升,同时也将出现制度与政策等新的风险。文章认为,需加强风险管理,不断完善养老保险制度,才能积极应对风险与收益的平衡。     

An empirical analysis of the factors influencing farmer demand for forest insurance: Based on surveys from Lin’an County in Zhejiang Province of China

The lack of effective farmer demand is a major factor that restricts the development of China's forest insurance. To solve this problem, this study uses a Logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of relevant factors in the farmers’ demand for forest insurance, based on field survey data of Lin’an County, Zhejiang Province. The results show that the farmers’ understanding of forest insurance, the proportion of forestry revenues in the total household income, forest size, forest disaster frequency, forest insurance liability, insurance amount setup, and the farmers’ satisfaction regarding the premium subsidy policy, are the main factors that affect the farmers’ demand for forest insurance. Therefore, we propose to expand forest insurance promotion, raise the farmers’ income, rationally design insurance products, and optimize the forest premium subsidy policy to enhance the farmers’ willingness to participate in forest insurance.     

Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.